Volume 84

Issue 4

Article 6

June 1982

Havalunch v. Mazza--The Scrambling of Constitutional and
Common Law Defamation Analysis in West Virginia
W. Martin Harrell
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
W. M. Harrell, Havalunch v. Mazza--The Scrambling of Constitutional and Common Law Defamation
Analysis in West Virginia, 84 W. Va. L. Rev. (1982).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss4/6

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Harrell: Havalunch v. Mazza--The Scrambling of Constitutional and Common L

HAVALUNCH v. MAZZA-THE SCRAMBLING
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW
DEFAMATION ANALYSIS IN WEST VIRGINIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The tort of defamation and the first amendment of the United
States Constitution1 have clashed repeatedly since the United
States Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2
in 1964. Prior to that decision, the first amendment did not affect
recovery for defamation. Since 1964, however, courts have struggled to accommodate the competing interests inherent in defamation actions and the first amendment: a state's desire to protect
an individual's reputation from harm and the societal goal of uninhibited, robust and wide-open discussion. The pendulum tipped
toward maximizing "free speech" during the 1960s and early 1970s,
but recent Supreme Court decisions have emphasized recovery
for reputational injury.' A sliding scale of first amendment protection has developed which focuses on the "status" of a particular
defamation plaintiff. Such plaintiffs are classified as public officials,
public figures or private figures in order to determine the standard of care owed them by media defendants. The more public
the person, the more difficult recovery will be.
Since Sullivan, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has had few opportunities to reconcile state common law defamation principles with the first amendment and article III, section
74 of the state constitution. Its latest opportunity came in

I "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ...."
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4 No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall be passed;
but the legislature may by suitable penalties, restrain the publication
or sale of obscene books, papers, or pictures, and provide for the punishment of libel, and defamation of character, and for the recovery, in civil
actions, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for such libel, or
defamation.
W. VA. CONsT. art. III, S 7.
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Havalunch,Inc. v. Mazza,' a case involving a libel' action brought
by a Morgantown restaurant. The eating establishment claimed
that a critical newspaper review of its food and "atmosphere" injured its business reputation. In a 4-0 decision,' the state supreme
court reversed an award of $15,000 in punitive damages and
ordered the complaint dismissed.
The court based its decision on both constitutional and common law principles of defamation law. The utilization of both in
a case which did not present complex legal issues8 indicates the
court's inability to deal with the constitutional dimension given
defamation law by the Supreme Court. This Note will focus on
one aspect of the court's opinion, although all the various grounds
of decision will be noted briefly. In its decision, the state supreme
court employed approximately two paragraphs of analysis in determining that Havalunch, a public restaurant, was a private figure.
This decision forced the court to decide what degree of fault such
libel plaintiffs must prove in West Virginia. The Supreme Court
had left states free to adopt varying standards in such cases, as
long as the common law practice of awarding damages without
fault was not reinstated.' The Supreme Court of Appeals, with
no analysis whatsoever and no explanation of its reasoning,
adopted negligence as the standard of care in private figure
defamation actions. 10
This Note will discuss the court's conclusion that Havalunch
constituted a prviate figure by applying the facts to the principles
adopted by the Supreme Court for public figure/private figure
analysis. Such an analysis was not present in the Havalunch decision. Next, the Note will discuss the court's adoption of a negligence standard and will explore the competing public policy
1 294

S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1981).

" The term "libel" usually refers to written communications, the term
"slander" to oral statements. "Defamation" encompasses both libel and slander.
See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS SS 111-12 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter
referred to as Prosser).
1 Mr. Justice McGraw disqualified himself. 294 S.E.2d at 78.
' The Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), mandated reversal of the jury's award of $15,000 in punitive damages.
Under federal constitutional law, punitive damages may be awarded for defamation only upon a showing that the defendant acted with actual malice. Id. at 347.
Therefore, any other issues reached by the court were unnecessary to dispose
of the case.

' Id. at 349.

10 294 S.E.2d at 73.
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arguments which the negligence and actual malice standard symbolize. The Note will argue that public policy, state common law
defamation principles and the state constitution all supported adoption of the actual malice rather than negligence standard.
II.

Havalunch, Inc. v. Mazza

The facts of Havalunch are not complex. In 1973, Mary Mazza, a student at West Virginia University, was a reporter for the
Daily Athenaeum, the school's student newspaper. An editor
assigned Mazza to write a humorous review of eating establishments in the university city. As part of this assignment, Mazza
visited the Havalunch eatery for the first time. The court's opinion aptly described the result.
She ordered a bacon, lettuce and tomato sandwich which she
found not at all to her liking. The bacon was overcooked, the
bread was dry and the lettuce had wilted. While ingesting her
sandwich, she observed the atmosphere and her careful gaze
remarked the amblings of one peripatetic roach. The roach did
not enhance the overall ambience provided for the enjoyment
of her food, so she left half her sandwich uneaten and departed
the Havalunch with the opinion that it was not an establishment
which she would recommend to a friend."
This less than auspicious visit produced a concise report in
the newspaper's restaurant review.
HAVALUNCH-Bring a can of Raid if you plan to eat here.
And paint your neck red; looks like a truck stop. You'll regret
everything you eat here, especially.the BLT's. 164 Pleasant
Street."
At trial, the restaurant produced evidence that the establishment's clientele consisted of business and professional persons during the day, with students and elderly persons dining at night.
The jury found for the plaintiff, awarding $15,000 in punitive
damages, but no compensatory damages. The state supreme court
unanimously reversed the verdict.13
In his opinion, Mr. Justice Neely identified three separate
grounds for reversing the lower court. First, the court held that
an award of punitive damages was invalid since the plaintiff had
" Id. at 72.
12

Id.

"3The decision was 4-0.
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not shown actual malice on the defendant's part,' a requirement
5
mandated by federal constitutional law." Thus, this flaw in the
case sufficed to render the verdict incorrect. Unfortunately, the
court decided to reach other issues, the result of "an obligation
to the bar to adumbrate this Court's direction in the law of defamation .... ."I6 Thus, the court held that the common law doctrine
of fair comment 7 provided the defendant with a qualified privilege
which Havalunch had not overcome at trial. 8 Next, the court
labeled the restaurant a private figure, with it having to prove
negligence to recover. 9 Finally, the court tied the fair comment
qualified privilege to the private figure/negligence constitutional
determination by holding that Mazza had not been negligent in
2
forming her opinion from facts observed during her visit. " This
aspect of the opinion ignored the fact that the fair comment
qualified privilege concerns expression of opinion while the public

" Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
'" Id. at 347.

11Interestingly, the court avoided reaching these issues only six months prior
to Havalunch. Both parties in Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981), had
briefed the public/private figure determination issue and the standard of fault
to be applied in private figure cases. That highly-publicized case involved a libel
suit by a coal company against two environmental organizations and a farmer
for communications made to federal agencies and statements contained in an
organizational newsletter. Since application of defamation law probably would
have resulted in a trial (the case was before the court on a writ of prohibition
request), the state supreme court relied instead on the right to petition contained
in the federal and state constitutions. The court did note in passing, however,
that the state constitution's freedom of the press clause would protect the defendants regarding communications made in the newsletter. The court did not
elaborate on this finding.
11At common law, the fair comment qualified privilege "was not limited to
officers and candidates, but extended to other matters of public concern .... "
Prosser, supra note 6, at 822. Since the fair comment privilege went to public
issues as well as public officials, the constitutionilization of the privilege in Sullivan
appeared to apply it to public issues. The Supreme Court rejected this approach
in Gertz.
Among the states prior to Sullivan, a split of authority existed over the extent
of the privilege. The majority recognized the privilege only in regard to opinion
based on true underlying facts. The minority viewpoint permitted use of the
privilege even where the underlying facts were incorrect. The minority viewpoint, to which West Virginia adhered, was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Sullivan. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
" 294 S.E.2d at 76.
19

Id. at 74.

Id. at 76.
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figure/private figure determination deals with misstatements of

fact."
The inadequacies of the court's analysis in Havalunch are
many. For example, the court failed to cite any West Virginia
cases dealing with defamation from the common law viewpoint
or to discuss the state constitutional principles relating to freedom
of the press and defamation.' The opinion failed to distinguish
between expressions of opinion, and the effect of federal constitutional defamation cases on common law privileges relating to
opinion," and misstatements of fact, the heart of the Sullivan decision. The most glaring omission was the lack of analysis given
the classification of Havalunch as a private figure, and the adopSee generally, R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 153-85 (1980)
(hereinafter referred to as Sack).
2 W. VA. CONST. art. III, S 7-8.
In Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339 (1974), the Supreme Court proclaimed, "Under
the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea." This has led some
commentators and courts to conclude that a defamation action cannot be based
on opinion where the underlying facts are disclosed. Sack, supra note 21, at 154.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized this argument in Mashburn v. Collin,
355 So.2d 879 (La. 1977), a restaurant review case similar to Havalunch and cited
in the state supreme court's opinion. In Mashburn,the court ruled that a defamation action cannot be based on opinion alone.
We conclude, therefore, that the First Amendment freedoms as defined
by the New York Times-Gertz series of decisions afford, at the very least,
a defense against defamation actions for expressions of opinion about
matters of public concern made without knowing or reckless falsity
.... While the states are free to impose liability for misstatements
of fact about private individuals made with fault, they may impose liability for expressions of defamatory opinions about matters of public concern only when made with knowing or reckless falsity.
Id. at 885. The court's reference to actual malice is puzzling unless it meant to
incorporate the view that at common law, the fair comment privilege could be
defeated only by a showing of malice.
The Louisiana court found that operation of a public restaurant to be a matter of public concern. Id. at 889. Since the court correctly recognized that a
public/private figure determination was irrelevant either to a fair comment
privilege analysis or a "no false idea" constitutional defense, the court did not
classify the restaurant as a public or private figure, unlike the West Virginia
court in Havalunch.See also Sack, supra note 21, at 181 n. 141, for listing of other
jurisdictions which have declared that an opinion cannot be the basis for a defamation action. Compare with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
For other restaurant review cases, see Ihle v. Florida Pub. Co., 5 MEDIA
L. REP. (BNA) 2005 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2081
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1742 (1981) (summary judgment for defendant upheld); Greer v. Columbus Monthly Pub. Corp., 7 MEDIA L.
REP. (BNA) 2094 (Ct. Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio 1981).
21

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

tion of the negligence standard for such libel plaintiffs. The court
failed to utilize the correct analysis for status determinations or
to cite any cases which had either adopted a negligence or actual
malice standard for private figure plaintiffs.?4
It is these latter errors which this Note will address. The facts
of Havalunch will be analyzed to determine whether it truly
qualified as a private figure. The question of actual malice v. negligence for private figure plaintiffs will be explored. As a preface
to these discussions, the Note will trace the evolution of defamation law in the United States and West Virginia from its common
law origins to its present constitutional underpinnings.
III. EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC FIGURE/PRIVATE
FIGURE DISTINCTION IN DEFAMATION LAW
A.

General Common Law

The common law tort of defamation has evolved over the centuries into a doctrine that is both difficult to understand and to
apply. As described by one writer,
[T]he English common law of defamation slowly grew into a forest
of complexities, overgrown with anomalies, inconsistencies, and
perverse rigidities. It became thicketed with brambled traps for
innocent defendants, crisscrossed with circuitous paths and dead
ends for seriously wronged plaintiffs, and enshrouded in a 'fog
of fictions, inferences, and presumptions.'25
The cause of action is based on the idea that defamation constitutes "an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name"2
which every individual possesses.
At common law, the defamation had to be an untrue state' Thirteen states have adopted a negligence standard for private figure libel
action while at least three jurisdictions have opted for the actual malice requirement. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. See also Sack, supra note
21, at 250-60.
In adopting the negligence standard, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals did not specify whether that standard was to be based on the "reasonably
prudent person" or a standard based on industry practice. Other jurisdictions
have split on this question. CompareTaskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash.
2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976), with Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d
76 (1975). See generally Sack, supra note 21, at 253-55.
' Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1350 (1975).
2 PROSSER, supra note six, at 737.
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ment about an identifiable party communicated to a third partyY
The communication's recipient had to be shown to have understood
to whom it referred and its defamatory meaning.28 A theory of
strict liability developed which made a publisher liable for even
innocent mistakes. Unlike other torts, a court presumed that the
individual had been damaged by publication, regardless of whether
actual injury occurred or was shown.' A court also presumed that
malice, the intent to injure, existed from publication."
To offset these presumptions, the law developed various
privileges which insulated a publisher from liability in certain
cases. An absolute privilege existed to report legislative and
judicial proceedings, and executive department communications."'
Lesser qualified privileges also protected the defendant, but these
could be lost either through unreasonable publication or the existence of express malice, i.e., the actual intent to injure, ill will
or spite.2
These qualified privileges included accounts of public proceedings, reports on matters of public interest and comment on
public issues. The question of privilege related primarily to the
allocation of the burden of proof in defamation actions. Once the
plaintiff established a primafacie case, the law imposed liability
unless the defendant could affirmatively plead truth of the statement or publication under a qualified privilege. Truth, like reports
of judicial proceedings, often was an absolute defense. If a defendant plead a qualifed privilege, and the court recognized its existence, then the burden of proof shifted to the plaintiff to overcome the privilege.' If such proof did not appear, then the defendant had defeated liability.
English common law defamation, transplanted to the United
States, continued to develop in the individual states. For almost
200 years, conventional thought did not see any conflict between
the first amendment and recovery for defamation. Under the
United States Supreme Court's practice of excluding certain
speech as outside the first amendment's scope, defamation long
' Id. at 776.

Id. at 767.
Id. at 755.

o Id. at 772.
3, Id. at 776-85.

: Id. at 785-96.
3 Id. at 796.
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had been an "out" category. As Mr. Justice Murphy said in his
oft-quoted dictum;
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of any ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.'
In 1964, the Supreme Court rejected this two-tier system of
analysis in Sullivan.
B.

The Supreme Court Revolutionizes DefamationLaw, 1964-74.

1.

Unanimity

In Rew York Times v. Sullivan,ua the Supreme Court provided
first amendment protection to publication of defamatory
statements. It did so by taking the common law qualified privilege
of "fair comment" and making it part of constitutional law.
The case arose after the newspaper printed a political advertisement concerning police activities in Montgomery, Ala. 5 The
advertisement, signed by nationally known persons involved in
the civil rights struggle, detailed various actions taken by police
against local demonstrators. Although the advertisement did not
specifically identify the plaintiff, the city police commissioner, it
contained several factual errors concerning alleged police activities.' The commissioner claimed that the advertisement defamed
him since he controlled police in the city. At trial under Alabama
defamation law, the jury awarded a $500,000 verdict. The Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed
the decision, and after reviewing the record, ordered the complaint dismissed. 7
In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan quickly

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have afforded some first amendment protection to
obscenity, "fighting" words, and commercial speech, other categories once excluded along with defamatory speech.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
376 U.S. at 257.
These mistakes included the incorrect identification of a song sung by
demonstrators at the state capitol and wrong reasons for exclusion of students
at a local black college. Id. at 258-59.
, Id. at 286.
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disposed on the argument that defamation did not qualify for first
amendment protection. "[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment."-" He noted that the advertisement involved "grievance and protest on one, of the major
public issues of our time .... ."" The Court rejected the idea that
the common law defense of truth sufficiently protected free speech
to satisfy the first amendment. Mere falsity of statement Or" injury to official reputation did not result in forfeiture of protection since the first amendment guaranteed citizens the right to
discuss and criticize government conduct. 0 To meet first amendment requirements, the Court transplanted the fair comment qualified privilege from common law to constitutional principle, providing citizens with a qualified constitutional privilege to defame
public officials. At common law, the fair comment privilege could
be overcome by a showing of malice, such as ill will or spite. The
Court transformed this element also by holding that only actual
malice could defeat the qualified constitutional privilege.4' Actual
malice was defined publication with "knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not."' 2 Application of the first amendment to defamation actions was grounded on the belief that "public debate should be"
uninhibited, robust and wideopen ... .""' In balancing the individual's interest in reputation and the first amendment, the
Court concluded that the actual malice standard sufficiently protected public officials. However, the Court refused to afford absolute protection in order to guard against the knowing lie."
2.

Fragmentation
In 1967, a divided Court extended the actual malice standard
5
to public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts"
consolidated two
13Id. at 269.
' Id. at 271.
" Id. at 272-74.
" Id. at 280.
42 Id
Id. at 270.
Provision of the actual malice conditional privilege allows plaintiffs to
prevail in cases of deliberate falsehoods.
41 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Butts case involved published reports that
the
plaintiff, head football coach at the University of Georgia, and University of
Alabama head coach "Bear" Bryant had "fixed" a college game. The other case,
Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), rev'd, 388 U.S.
'
"
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cases, one brought by a college football coach and the other by
a retired United States Army general. In the consolidated decision, four justices rejected the idea that public figures should have
to meet the actual malice standard.46 Four other justices wanted
to extend the rule to such cases.47 In casting the decisive fifth
vote to extend the actual malice standard, Chief Justice Warren
found that Butts had met the test, but that the general had not.48
Thus, the coach's trial court judgment was affirmed while that
of Gen. Walker was reversed.49 The Chief Justice explained his
view in a concurring opinion.
To me, differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public
officials' and adoption of separate standards of proof for each
have no basis in law, logic or first amendment policy. Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and
private sectors are blurred ....
Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they
are not subject to the restraints of the political process, 'public
figures,' like 'public officials,' often play an influential role in
ordering society ....
Our citizenry has a legitimate and substan-

tial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the
press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement
in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of
'public officials.'"
After Butts, the Court had to define the type of proof needed
to prove actual malice. In St. Amcant v. Thompson,51 the Court held
that a showing of negligence or even gross negligence did not
satisfy constitutional requirements.2 "There must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.",, This
standard clearly required that the plaintiff show intent to publish
an untrue statement, or the disregarding of a statement which
130, concerned a report that retired General Edwin Walker had lead an anti-civil
rights mob during a riot at the University of Mississippi.
" Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart and Fortas opposed extension of the actual malice standard to public figures.
Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and White approved, as a minimum constitutional safeguard, extension of New York Times to public figures.
48 388 U.S. 130, 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the
result).
47

49

Id.

Id. at 163-164.
U.S. 727 (1968).
" Id. at 731.
3 Id.
51 390
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should have alerted the publisher to its falsity, since the test implied that a responsible publisher would refrain from publication
in those instances.
Although Butts had revealed the fragmentation of the Sullivan
Court, the justices divided even further in 1971. In Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc.,' a plurality led by Justice Brennan sought
to extend the actual malice standard to discussion of material of
"public or general interest."' Such an extension had been forecast
by commentators after Sullivan."'
Rosenbloom involved a plaintiff arrested for distribution of supposedly obscene material.57 A radio station had broadcast details
of the arrest, labeling the literature as obscene rather than
"allegedly obscene."5 A jury acquitted Rosenbloom of criminal
charges and he sued the radio station for defamation. 9
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Mr. Justice Blackmun, rejected application of first amendment protection based on status.
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved. The public's primary interest
is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not
the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.'
The remaining six justices split along a variety of doctrines.
Mr. Justice Black adhered to his "absolutist" position that recovery
for defamation automatically violated the first amendment.6 1 Mr.
Justice White concurred in the judgment, but feared that the plurality standard swept too broadly. He favored limiting the decision to public issues involving official acts of government officials.2
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 43 (plurality opinion).
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment", 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 540 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Emerson].
403 U.S. at 33.

',

Id.
Id.
Id.
6,Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

34.
36.
43.
57 (Black, J., concurring in judgment).
62 (White, J., dissenting).
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Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented,O rejecting outright the plurality opinion. They argued, although not in total harmony, that the state's interest in protecting reputation outweighed
first amendment concerns in cases involving private individuals."
They sought to allow the states to define the standard of fault
applicable in such actions.' Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate
in the decision.
Three years later, the Rosenbloom dissents would become law
and the "public -or general interest" test discarded in federal constitutional law. The period of expanding first amendment protection in defamation actions ended in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.6
3.

The "Finality" Of Gertz

In Gertz, the Supreme Court declined to extend the actual
malice rule to libel plaintiffs labeled "private figures." Elmer
Gertz, a well-known attorney in liberal political circles, had been
labeled a communist by the John Birch Society. Gertz sued, with
the lower courts ruling that he was a private figure, but that he
had to show actual malice to recover." By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Justices Rehnquist and Powell had replaced
Justices Black and Harlan. Both replacements helped form the
five-person majority which rejected the Rosenbloom test. Additionally, Mr. Justice Blackmun, who had joined the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, now joined the Gertz majority. He did so not
out of any conviction that the "status" test of Gertz was superior
to the "issue" test of Rosenbloom, but rather to provide "certainty" in defamation law. 8 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Douglas and White dissented. 9
Basically, the Gertz majority adopted the views advanced by
Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
U

Id.

65

Id. at 86.

418 U.S. 323 (1974). The case grew out of the shooting of a Chicago teenager
by a city policeman. The youth's family retained Gertz as counsel in a wrongful
death action. Soon afterwards, the in-house organ of the John Birch Society published an article declaring the lawyer a communist and accusing him of "fram6

ing" the officer.
7 Id. at 328-30.
Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 354 (Burger, O.J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (White, J., dissenting).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss4/6

12

Harrell: Havalunch v. Mazza--The Scrambling of Constitutional and Common L

HAVALUNCH v. MAZZA

1982]

Justices Harlan and Marshall in their Rosenbloom dissents." Thus,
the Court decided to allow states to set a different standard of
fault for suits by private individuals as long as strict liability was
not imposed. 1 Additionally, presumed damages could no longer
be given, only those resulting from actual injury.2 Moreover,
punitive damages could be given only upon a showing of actual
malice.73 The decision represented a rebalancing of the competing
interests. Allowing states to set the standard of fault recognized
their interest in protecting a private individual's reputation. The
changes in awarding of damages theoretically safeguarded the
media from the common law's tendency to allow recovery even
where no injury occurred. Additionally, no punitive damages could
be awarded absent a showing of actual malice.
The majority offered two rationales for adopting a sliding scale
of first amendment protection based on status. First, the Court
said public persons had greater access to media to counteract
defamation-the "more speech/self-help" theory.7 4 Second, public
persons voluntarily entered the public arena, therefore, they
forfeited some right to protection from false comments. 5 In contrast, a private individual "has relinquished no part of his interest
in the protection of his own good name ....

Thus, private in-

dividuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures, they are also more deserving of
recovery."'
The majority criticized the "public or general interest" standard as an inadequate attempt to balance competing interests.
On the one hand, a private individual whose reputation is injured by [a] defamatory falsehood that does concern an issue
of public or general interest has no recourse unless he can meet
the vigorous requirements of New York Times ....
71 See

On the other

generally, 403 U.S. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 78 (Marshall,

J., dissenting).
71418 U.S. at 347.
1'Id. at 349. The court did not define actual injury, saying it "is not limited
to out-of-pocket loss." Id. at 350. This "limitation"on recovery, then, may not be
a restriction at all. See, e.g., Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone:A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L. Rav. 645, 670-71 (1977).
1 418 U.S. at 349. This requirement alone was sufficient to dispose of the
Havalunch case.
Id. at 344.
"
7

Id. at 345.
Id.
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hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error which
a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or general interest
may be held liable in damages even if it took every reasonable
precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertion."
Having adopted a bifurcated status test, the Court then
divided the public figure category first announced in Butts. It
noted in passing that one could become an involuntary public
figure, but expressed serious doubt on how this could occur2A8
The majority then divided voluntary public figures into two types.
Persons of "pervasive power and influence"SB who "have assumed
roles of especial prominence" would be public figures for any purpose. Individuals who had "thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to enforce the resolution
of the issues involved '' would be public figures in actions arising
out of the specific public controversy. Subsequent cases have dealt
almost exclusively with the latter classification.
Thus, the Court had taken a decade to move from Sullivan
to the issue focus of Rosenbloom to the status standard of Gertz.
From now on, a plaintiffs status as a public or private individual
would be the key in determining how the first amendment affected
defamation actions. Since Gertz, a nearly unanimous Court has
considered three cases asking "who is a public figure?"'"
C.

Refining the Public Figure Definition

Gertz had only outlined the parameters of the public figure
definition. It took only two years for a case to arrive in front of
the Supreme Court to test Gertz's neat categories.
77

Id. at 346.

78Id. at 345.
7&b
79

i

Id.

B Id.

" The Supreme Court has dismissed writs of certiorari in two cases involving the public figure question by agreement of the parties. The first, Street v.
NBC, No. 80-6835, cert. dismissed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3477 (Dec. 4, 1981) concerned a
woman involved in the famous "Scottsboro Boys" rape trial in 1931. The legal
question involved whether her public figure status obtained in 1931 remained
in force today for purposes of a movie on that trial. The lower court had held
the woman to be a public figure today. The second case, Wilson v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., No. 81-412, cert. dismissed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3505 (Dec. 18, 1981),
dealt with which party has the burden of proving the falsity or truthfulness of
statements in a private figure libel suit. The lower court had placed the burden
of proving falsity upon the plaintiff.
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Time, Inc. v. Firestone' concerned the publication of the
results of a well-publicized divorce in Florida in Time magazine.
The article said that a member of the Firestone family had obtained a divorce from his wife on grounds of adultery."' This was
erroneous because Florida law did not allow alimony awards in
divorce actions given on grounds of adultery and Mrs. Firestone
had been granted alimony.' Despite the extensive publicity concerning the trial itself and the fact that Mrs. Firestone participated
in news conferences, the Supreme Court found that she was a
private individual.85
The Court focused on the nature of the controversy to conclude that the plaintiff had not thrust herself into the public's
eye voluntarily and that no public controversy existed. 8 Although
the public certainly was interested in the trial, the Court made
a value judgment similar to that it found wanting under the
Rosenbloom test. Newsworthiness, said the Court, did not
necessarily equal a public controversy.' Thus, if a judge did not
consider the information particularly needed by the public, no
public controversy existed.
Two 1979 cases, the most recent involving definition of public
figures,' indicate that the Court wants to narrow the public figure
classification. This will allow more persons to be considered private
individuals and thus escape the actual malice requirement in some
jurisdictions.
89
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
the Wisconsin senator had
awarded his monthly "Golden Fleece" award to the federal agency which had given research grants to the plaintiff. The trial court
and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that Hutchinson was a public figure for "comment on his receipt
of federal funds for research projects." 9 These courts had focused
on the plaintiffs application for public funds and the subsequent
reporting of the award." Additionally, they had found that the

424 U.S. 448 (1976).

Id. at 452.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 454 n.3.
Id. at 454.
87 Id.

See note 81, supra.
443 U.S. 111 (1979).
Id. at 134.
9,Id. at 119.
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plaintiffs ability to respond to Proxmire's charges demonstrated
sufficient access to the media.92 In an 8-1 decision, the Court held
that the scientist was a private individual.
In rejecting the access finding, the Supreme Court noted that
access must be present before the alleged defamation occurs. 3
Otherwise, the Court reasoned, any attempt to respond would turn
a private individual into a public figure. Hutchinson's grant applications were insufficient to indicate that he had voluntarily
entered a controversy to influence its outcome. Additionally, general taxpayer concerns with expenditures of public funds 4did not
create a specific controversy for the plaintiff to enter.
The second case, Woiston v. Reader'sDigest Association, Inc.,"
reinforced the conclusion that public figure classifications will be
more difficult for media defendants to obtain. Wolston had been
held in contempt in 1958 for not appearing before a grand jury
investigating Soviet espionage activity. His failure to appear drew
extensive media coverage at the time." In 1979, the defendant
published a book labeling Wolston a Soviet agent. The lower courts
held Wolston to be a limited public figure, apparently in relation
to actions by law enforcement agencies during the espionage
investigation.9 7 Additionally, Wolston had met the voluntariness
requirement by failing to appear before the grand jury. 8
The Supreme Court, again in an 8-1 vote, rejected the public
figure determination. It characterized the plaintiff as being
"dragged" into court,99 similar to the "lack of choice" made by
Mrs. Firestone in contesting her divorce."' The Court said a trial
court must examine the "nature and extent" of an individual's
participation in determining voluntary participation. 1 Wolston,
like Gertz, had not discussed his case with the press." Additionally, he had not played a major role in any controversy regarding
'
'

Id. at 134.

"He (Hutchinson) did not have the regular and continuing access to the
media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public figure." Id. at 136.
' Id. at 135.

9 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
'6 Id. at 162.
'9 Id. at 166 n.8.

" Id. at 167.
Id. at 166.
10 424 U.S. 448.
"' 443 U.S. at 167.

Id.

102
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the appropriateness of government actions. Once again the Court
explained that it would not let media attention determine public
figure status. "A private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or
associated with a matter that attracts public attention ....

A

libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to
justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times.""'
These cases, taken together with Firestoneand Gertz, indicate
that a libel plaintiff must almost make a conscious decision to attract the public's attention. Mere attention is not enough; the trial
court must look at the manner and quality of participation. The
evidence must show that the plaintiff voluntarily entered an existing public controversy with the intentionof influencing the outcome. Media access is another fundamental factor to be considered.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring in Wolston, perhaps summed
up the requirements best. "[A] person becomes a limited-issue
public figure only if he literally or figuratively 'mounts a rostrum'
to advocate a particular view."'0 4
III. DEFAMATION ACTIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA

A.

Common Law

Case law is sparse in West Virginia concerning defamation
actions, but the common law appears to track that prevalent in
other jurisdictions prior to New York Times v. Sullivan. Strict
liability was imposed for false statements. The plaintiff had only
to show publication of a defamatory statement by the defendant
to subject the publisher to liability."' As in other jurisdictions,
a claim of libel was actionable without proof of damages."6 West
Virginia courts recognized the qualified privileges by which strict
liability could be defeated. As defined in an early case, "[wihenever
...the

defendant is acting bona fide in the discharge of any legal,

moral or social duty, his answer will be privileged.""' To receive
the benefit of a qualified privilege, a defendant had to prove that

Id. at 167-68.
,oId. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring in result).
,' Colcord v. Gazette Publishing Co., 106 W. Va. 419, 424, 145 S.E. 751, 753
(1928).
I Id.
'o Ward v. Ward, 47 W. Va. 766, 772, 35 S.E. 873, 876 (1900). See also Mauck
v. City of Martinsburg, 280 S.E.2d 216, 222 (W. Va. 1980), a defamation case brought
under the "insulting words" statute.
103
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the occasion or event which sparked publication was privileged,
such as a report on a public proceeding, and that the communication had been made within the scope of the privilege." 8
Many of the defamation cases in West Virginia differentiated
between slander and libel only in the manner each was published.1"
Additionally, little distinction was made in substantive requirements for common law defamation actions and suits brought
under the state's "insulting words" statute."' An examination of
two cases reveals how qualified privileges operated and the leeway
they gave judges in deciding cases.
Bargerv. Hood,"' decided in 1920, concerned a dispute between
two publishers who had contracted to publicize the town of Keyser.
The plaintiff failed to perform his part of the contract; therefore,
the defendant secured the services of another publisher. The
various parties exchanged published charges of dishonesty and
engaged in character assasination. 12 As a defense, the defendant
pled the qualified privilege which permitted one to protect
business interests. The defendant claimed that his published
charges had been an attempt to protect the original publicity
contract."' The state supreme court agreed, ruling that the publication had been conditionally privileged. The pleaded privilege,
however, limited publication of the rebuttal only to persons with
similar interests as the defendant. Since publication had occurred
in a newspaper read by persons without the defendant's interest,
the court held that the privilege had been lost and imposed strict
liability.-"
When the plaintiff could not show abuse of the qualified
privilege, the defendant escaped liability. In Swearingen v.
ParkersburgSentinel Co.," 5 a newspaper editorialized concerning
a public official's handling of public funds. A state audit furnished
the basic facts for the editorial. The defendant pled several
qualified privileges, including fair comment. The supreme court
of appeals held that "[a]nything connected with the plaintiff's of108Stewart v. Riley, 114 W. Va. 578, 172 S.E. 791 (1934).
See, e.g., id.
no W. VA. CODE S 55-7-2 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
'"

87 W. Va. 78, 104 S.E. 280 (1920).
at 83-84; id. at 283.

112Id.
113
114

Id.; id.
Id.; id.

...125 W. Va. 731, 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943).
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ficial duties was a proper subject of discussion which, if made

without malice, was not libelous."'' 6 The court then ruled that the
defendant's action had not exceeded the privilege; therefore, the
plaintiff had to show express malice to recover. It could not do
so and no liability attached to the newspaper company.

West Virginia defamation law did differ from that in other
jurisdictions in two important respects. In many states, the
defense of truth, if proven, operated as an absolute bar to
recovery. West Virginia law required more. Article 3, section 8,
of the state constitution permitted truth to be pled as a defense,
provided that publication occurred "with good motives and for
justifiable ends."1 17 Consequently, in prosecuting a defamation action, proof of ill will or spite which caused publication of a true
statement, defamatory in nature, theoretically could permit
recovery.
A second difference concerned the extent of the fair comment
qualified privilege. This privilege allowed opinion criticism,
especially newspaper editorials, on matters of public interest.'
The majority of jurisdictions permitted the privilege to protect
only expressions of opinion based upon true facts." 9 The opinion
could be incorrect as long as the underlying information was true.
The minority view extended protection to incorrect opinion based
on incorrect facts."0
In Bailey v. Charleston Daily Mail Association,'' the state
supreme court adopted the minority view. In discussing the opposing views, the court said the majority view feared extension
,,IId. at 744, id. at 215.

W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 8.
W"
,,Prosser, note 6 supra, at 792.
,,l
Bailey v. Charleston Daily Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 304, 27 S.E.2d 837,
843 (1943).
"I See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20, for a listing of jurisdictions adhering
to the minority view.
1Z1126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837. The case involved a defamation suit brought
by a state official who claimed that an editorial had libeled him. The editorial
had recited facts surrounding the state's purchase of a bridge, and had implied
that political friends of the official had profited from the deal. Id. at 295, id. at
839. The editorial contained incorrect statements of fact which created a false
impression. Id. at 301, id. at 842. Under the majority rule, the fair comment
privilege did not protect the publication and the defendant was liable for damages.
Under the minority view, the qualified privilege attached, but could be overcome
by the plaintiff on a showing of excessive publication or il-will.
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of the privilege would prevent qualified persons from seeking office for fear of defamation.1" Additionally, extension would give
the media a "license to libel".1" In contrast, the minority view
believed extension would open the dishonest official to exposure."
Moreover, the honest public official would not be injured by allowing official acts "to be canvassed with a freedom and latitude consistent with good faith and that freedom of statement is conducive
to a high standard in the activities of the public press."'" The
court then explained why it preferred the minority view.
A citizen of a free state having an interest in the conduct of
the affairs of his government should not be held to strict accountability for misstatement of fact, if he has tried to ascertain the truth anol, on a reasonable basis, honestly and in good
faith believes that the statements made by him are true. '
The state supreme court decided Bailey in 1943. Twenty-one years
later, the United States Supreme Court would adopt the minority view, albeit with the more stringent actual malice standard,
and make it constitutional law in Sullivan.2
In general, then, defamation law in West Virginia paralleled
that in other states. The additional requirements for truth as a
defense theoretically narrowed a defendant's ability to escape liability. Bailey, however, gave some thought to the need of allowing some errors to go unpunished in order to meet higher societal
goals-open debate on the actions of government officials and a
higher standard of conduct by these officials. The cases show that
West Virginia courts, like those elsewhere, gave little thought
to the interplay between defamation, the first amendment and
the state constitution's freedom of the press clause.
B.

Post-Sullivan Decisions

The state supreme court had ruled on only three constitutional
defamation cases prior to Havalunch.ln All involved public officials
or candidates for public office. The opinions, especially that in
1 Id. at 304; id. at 843.
123Id; id.
124Id.; id.
1" Id. at 304-05; id123Id.

at 306-07; id. at 844.
See generally, Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
1 In Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 200 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1981), the court
relied on a qualified privilege involving employer-employee relations to shield
the city from liability. Id. at 221. The court avoided defamation law altogether

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss4/6

20

Harrell: Havalunch v. Mazza--The Scrambling of Constitutional and Common L

HAVALUNCH v. MAZZA

1982]

Havalunch, indicate that the court has yet to fully comprehend
the revolution in defamation law caused by Sullivan and progeny.
The first post-Sullivan case did not occur until ten years after
the Supreme Court's landmark decision. In Starr v. Beckley
Newspapers Corp., the court ruled on a certified question asking whether a municipal policeman was a public official within
the Sullivan definition. The case dealt with a published report
that the officer's son had been jailed on a bad check charge. The
story's headline, however, identified the officer as having been
arrested. More than 11,000 copies of the newspaper were printed
and distributed before anyone noted the mistake." The court had
no difficulty in conluding that Starr was a public official since St.
Amant v. Thompson,' decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1968, had involved a deputy sheriff. The Supreme Court
had not hesitated to declare the law enforcement officer a public
official and to require him to prove actual malice to recover.
The next case, Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc.,'32
distinguished between published articles and headlines. In 1968,
Jim Sprouse and Arch Moore, Jr., opposed one another for governor. Just before the election, the Moore staff supplied the
CharlestonDailyMail with information regarding an out-of-state
land development company headed by Sprouse.' The Daily Mail,
a Republican newspaper and ardent Moore supporter, printed several stories and editorials concerning the company's actions in buying land and then selling it to the U.S. Forest Service. These articles implied that Sprouse had acted unethically and perhaps illegally. Although the articles appeared fairly neutral, the headlines
included such phrases as "'Sprouse's Land Grab', 'Candidate
Cleans Up', and 'Realty Bonanza: ""3Sprouse lost the election and
sued for defamation. A jury returned a verdict of $250,000 in compensatory and $500,000 in punitive damages."'
in Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981), a libel case which involved the
public/private figure determination. Instead, the court relied on an absolute first
amendment right to petition theory and ordered the complaint dismissed.
157 W. Va. 447, 201 S.E.2d 911 (1974).
Id. at 449-50, 201 S.E.2d at 912.
,s' 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
'32 211

S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
Id. at 683-84.

13

Id.

at 685.

On appeal, the state supreme court disallowed the original punitive damage
award of $750,000 as "excessive." Id. at 681.
13
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On appeal, the state supreme court relied on Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy"8 to hold that political candidates must prove actual
malice. The court then attempted to repeat the definition of that
standard as used by the Supreme Court.
In libel actions 'malice' does not connote the mere dislike of one
party for another or the intent of one party to injure another
....In libel law, 'malice' has a much narrower definition and
requires not only a deliberate intent to injure, but also an intent to injure through the publication of false or misleading
defamatory statements known by the publisher or its agents
to ...injure through publication of such defamatory statements
with reckless and wilfull disregard for their truth."7
The court appeared to state that the personal motives of the
publisher could be shown to show actual malice. Herbert v.
Lando,"8 a 1979 Supreme Court decision, supports such a theory.
Later in the opinion, however, the court set forth the elements
needed for recovery by a political candidate. Listed separately
from actual malice was the requirement that material be "published with an intent to injure."'39
The Sprouse requirements for recovery may be read in two
ways. Mr. Justice Neely may have confused actual malice and the
intent to injure, making each a separate element of recovery when
he really only meant that proof of intent went toward showing
actual malice. Alternatively, he may have deliberately made intent to injure a separate category in order to make the actual
malice test more stringent in West Virginia than that announced
by the Supreme Court in Sullivan.4 ' Intent to injure and
13 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
..211 S.E.2d at 681-82.
441 U.S. 153 (1979).
211 S.E.2d at 683. A public official must also show a false statement,
defamatory in nature, which was known at the time of publication to be false. Id.
"0 Given Mr. Justice Neely's authorship of the Havalunch opinion and its
adoption of the less stringent negligence standard, it is difficult to believe that
the Sprouse definition of actual malice was intended to make recovery for public
officials and public figures more difficult in West Virginia than elsewhere.
"I In Gertz, the court limited recovery to actual injury unless actual malice
was proven. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals disallowed punitive
damages in Sprouse even though the plaintiff had shown actual malice. The court
reasoned that punitive damages "may only be recovered in cases where the award
of actual damages is insufficient to dissuade others in the future." 211 S.E.2d at 692.
However, the court said Sprouse had demonstrated $250,000 in actual
damages. Equating defamation with actual malice to an intentional tort, the court
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knowledge of falsity, while similar, are distinct issues. Sprouse

has confused the definition of actual malice in West Virginia.
The Sprouse case also pointed out how the Gertz requirement
of actual injury damages can be circumvented. Although the court
reduced the trial court's award to $250,000, it made no specific
ruling on what injuries the plaintiff actually had suffered.
Presumably, they flowed from mental anguish, embarassment and
perhaps any damage to Sprouse's law practice."'
As did Starr, the final case arose on a procedural question.
Neal v. Huntington Publishing Co.' involved a former county
sheriff who had run for Congress in 1972. The newspaper had carried a political advertisement imputing criminal conduct to a
"sheriff." An organization supporting a candidate for sheriff in
Ohio had placed the advertisement, but had failed to specify which
sheriff or which county election."' Ruling on a certified question,
the court held that extrinsic evidence could be introduced to identify the person allegedly libeled.
Thus, the post-Sullivan cases do not provide much guidance
on defamation law in West Virginia. Of course, much of the common law has been altered by Sullivan, Butts, and Gertz. What
remained to be settled at the state level was the standard of fault
to be applied in private figure libel actions. In Havalunch, Inc.
v. Mazza,'" the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded
that a private figure must prove negligence in order to recover.
This Note will conclude that federal constitutional law would
have made it difficult to classify the restaurant as a public figure.
Thus, the state supreme court reached the correct result in classifying the eatery a private figure, despite its lack of analysis. The
Note will conclude, however, that state common law, the state
constitution, and public policy pointed toward adoption of the acsaid awarding damages for "personal humiliation, mental anguish, and indignity"
was "the exclusive province of the jury." Id. Further reasoning, Mr. Justice Neely said: "In light of the amount of jury awards for pain and suffering which are
routinely sustained by appellate courts in tort actions involving physical injury,
and considering the rank and station in life of the plaintiff, the Court finds that
the award of $250,000 actual damages was not excessive." Id.
142

223 S.E.2d 792 (W. Va. 1976).

The advertisement appeared in a newspaper which circulated in three
states and more than 25 counties. Each county was electing a sheriff during the
1972 campaign.
"' Havalunch, supra note five.
",
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tual malice standard for all defamation plaintiffs, including private
figures.
V.

A.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Havalunch As A Public Figure

As discussed previously, recent Supreme Court decisions have
narrowed the public figure classification. However, the state
supreme court failed to discuss or even cite Hutchinson or
Wolston 45 Rather, the court declared that "it is a close question"
whether a restaurant such as Havalunch engaged in "a business
of sufficient public concern to place it in the public figure or public
'
issue category."146
Mr. Justice Neely concluded that the restaurant
qualified for private figure status based on the large number of
restaurants in Morgantown. 47 Moreover, the eatery had not solicited reviews nor held itself out "as a place of particular interest
or culinary quality." '
Proper analysis of the public figure determination in
Havalunch should have been conducted through use of the threeprong test of Gertz-Wolston. First, did a pre-existing controversy
exist prior to publication of the restaurant review? Second, did
the plaintiff voluntarily inject itself into the dispute? Third, did
any such participation occur with an intent to influence the result
of the controversy?
1.

Public Controversy

This requirement has been criticized because of its subjective nature. Determination of whether a public controversy exId.
The language reveals the court's confusion between constitutional and
common law defamation principles. A public figure determination applies to the
constitutional analysis required under Gertz and Butts' actual malice standard.
Had the United States Supreme Court adopted the Rosenbloom "public or general
interest" test, then the actual malice standard would have attached had the
restaurant's operation been found a matter of public concern. Under Gertz, a finding of public concern, without a finding of public figure status, relates only to
the availability of the common law qualified privilege of fair comment to the defendant. Cf. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So.2d 879 (La. 1977) (restaurant review).
1. 294 S.E.2d at 74.

" The court apparently used this language to distinguish a non-descript diner
from an eating facility which advertised itself as offering a particular cuisine.
See Mashburn v. Collins, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977).
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ists, the Gertz test, differs little from a requirement that the
publication concern matters of "public or general interest," the
Rosenbloom criterion. The subjectivity criticized by the Gertz
majority"' as inherent in the Rosenbloom test is heightened by
the Supreme Court's insistence that newsworthiness does not
equal public controversy." Consequently, a judge rather than the
media has been invested with the power to determine what the
public should hear or read.
In any event, it is readily apparent that no controversy existed regarding Havalunchitself prior to the review's publication.
Indeed, the restaurant review was a supplement to the Daily
Athenaeum's normal reporting fare. Mazza had never eaten at the
restaurant prior to her assignment to review the food and service. Although the quality of eating establishments in a college
town often is a hotly disputed topic, neither this general issue
nor the restaurant itself was part of any pre-existing controversy.
2.

Voluntariness of Havalunch's Participation With Intent To
Influence A Controversy

Even if a controversy existed prior to publication of the
review, participation in the dispute must have been undertaken
voluntarily with an intent to influence the outcome. In cases involving business entities rather than natural persons, at least one
court has found that corporate status points strongly toward a
public figure determination regardless of the presence of the voluntariness and intent factors .1 5 The majority of courts, however,
have reaffirmed the Supreme Court's mandate that such a deter-

. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
11 See generally, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
51 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C.
1976). The court reasoned that since corporations do not possess "personal" reputations, the Gertz requirement did not apply.

This traditional doctrine does no more than recognize the obvious fact

that a libel action brought on behalf of a corporation does not involve
'the essential dignity and worth or every human being' and, thus, is
not 'at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty: Consequently,
a corporate libel action is not 'a basis of our constitutional system,' and

need not force the first amendment to yield as far as it would be in
a private libel action.

Id. at 955.
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mination must be based on the facts of a particular case, not the
62
plaintiffs organizational status."
For the most part, these cases have dealt with large business
enterprises, not a small retail establishment such as Havalunch.
The possible rationale for distinguishing corporate and human
plaintiffs begins with injuries for which each may recover. Natural
persons may be awarded damages for actual injury to business
and personal reputation, for mental anguish and embarassment.1"
A corporation cannot suffer mental injuries; its damages are
limited to those directly involving the business operation.1 1 In
Havalunch,the jury apparently believed that the restaurant had
suffered no injury to business or reputation since it did not award
any compensatory damages.
The restaurant's corporate status ties directly to the question of participation in public controversy. Havalunch admittedly
was a profit-oriented business which catered to the public. Operation of a public business has been argued as sufficient to support
a finding of public figure or at least of public interest."5 In this
case, however, no evidence existed of a particular advertising campaign designed to draw public attention to itself. 56 Moreover,
under the Supreme Court's analysis, the mere fact that a person
or business is a legitimate subject of a reporter's story does not
automatically transform one into a public figure. "Voluntary"
operation of a public restaurant can be equated with the finding
of involuntariness made by the Supreme Court in Firestone and
Wolston. In those cases, the subjects of news stories appeared
in court not of their own choosing. In Havalunch, the restaurant
operated on its own accord, but such operation did not render
it immediately subject to public figure status. If a person who
voluntarily engages in criminal conduct is not necessarily a public
figure, as the Supreme Court has said in dictum, then awarding
'" See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583
(1st Cir. 1980). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the argument
that corporations inherently enjoy greater media access than individuals. Id. at 589.
15 Prosser, supra note six, at 761.

15 West Virginia case law reflects this view. "[A corporation] may sue and
recover for a libel, spoken or published, against it ag a corporate entity, or for
slander upon it,
injuriously affecting its trade or business." Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 W. Va. 561, 564, 103 S.E. 923,925 (1920) (emphasis added).
' Martin Marietta Corp., supra note 151.
5 Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980) (ad campaign
triggered public controversy).
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public figure status to a small diner seems difficult to support."'
An articulated, but informal principle in the public figure
determination deals with the plaintiffs access to the media prior
to publication of the alleged defamatory article. Media access has
been a recurrent theme in defamation cases since Sullivan. The
Supreme Court justified adoption of the actual malice standard
for public officials and public figures on the theory that they commanded media attention and could use "more speech" to counteract
defamatory statements." Conversely, the court has used a finding of no access to define the private figure and to justify different treatment of such individuals.'59
Like the formal principles, the question of media access turns
on the facts in each case. The court's opinion in Havalunch
specifically noted that the restaurant had not soliticited any
reviews nor held itself out as a "special" place to dine.60 There
is no evidence to show that Havalunch had ready access to media
outlets. Since access must be more than "fleeting,"'' the access
question must be resolved in the restaurant's favor.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that courts must determine public figure status on a case's particular facts. The manner
of a person's participation is the crucial consideration. Conduct
must be "calculated to draw attention to (a person) in order to
invite public comment or influence the public
"....
"2 A court
must examine what a plaintiff did or how that action influenced
the controversy's outcome. The Court based this requirement on
the common-sense assumption that persons participate in public
matters to influence the outcome. Therefore, given the lack of
intentional participation in a public controversy to influence the

"' "This reasoning leads us to reject the further contention of respondents
that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public
figure ....
Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168.
" "'[P]ublic figures' have as ready access as 'public officials' to mass media
of communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views
and activities." Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result).
,s' See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
294 S.E.2d at 74.
161 To be a public figure, one must have "regular and continuing access to
the media." Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136.
" "We emphasized that a court must focus on the 'nature and extent of
an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to defamation.'" Id. at 157.
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outcome and the lack of media access, 1 3 the state supreme court
correctly found the restaurant to be a private figure in terms of
constitutional analysis.164
VI.

WEST VIRGINIA'S ADOPTION OF THE NEGLIGENCE
STANDARD FOR PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS

Once the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals classified
Havalunch as a private figure, it adopted negligence as the standard of care owed such plaintiffs. The court made this decision
without analyzing the competing considerations and without explaining the reasons for its choice."6 5 Instead, it merely cited Gertz
66
as authority for adopting a standard based on fault."
Moreover,
the court did not discuss or even cite cases from other jurisdictions which have adopted either a negligence6 7 or an actual malice
standard.'" These cases are important because they reflect the
continuing division over the Supreme Court's rejection of the
"public or general interest" test outlined in Rosenbloom. Courts
" Another line of argument to have Havalunch labeled a public figure would
have been the extensive regulation of the restaurant industry. In American Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v. McIntrye, 375 So. 2d 239 (Ala. 1979) (per curiam), the Alabama
Supreme Court held an insurance company to be a public figure. "It cannot be
successfully argued that a corporation whose dealings are subject to close regulation by our state government, and, indeed, whose very existence as an entity
is owing to that government, does not invite attention and comment from the
news media." Id. at 242. See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341,
1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
'6 Such a finding was irrelevant to whether the fair comment privilege protected the defendant's publication.
' 294 S.E.2d at 73.
166 Id.
I See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216
(1977) (en banc); Phillips v. Evening Star Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. App. 1980); Cahill
v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Troman
v. Wood, 62 Il. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1976); Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 216 Kan.
223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); McCall v. Courier-Journal Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981);
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975);
Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334
N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television,
549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn.
1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976); cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981); Taskett
v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (en banc).
'" Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
913 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d
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favoring a negligence standard approve the balancing of interests
reflected in Gertz. Those jurisdictions adopting a higher standard
of fault generally approve the Rosenbloom standard. Therefore,
this Note will examine decisions from both sides of the argument
in order to provide the analysis not present in Havalunch. The
Note will conclude that the supreme court of appeals should have
adopted actual malice as the standard for all defamation plaintiffs, without any requirement of a finding of public issue or public
controversy.
A.

Negligence Standard

Since 1974, at least thirteen states have adopted a negligence
standard as an element of a defamation suit brought by a private
individual. These courts reason, as did the Gertz majority, that
this standard protects both the reputational interest of the individual, while negating the inhibiting effects of common law strict
accountability.
A recent Utah Supreme Court decision, Seegmiller v. KSL,
Inc.,"" typifies this view. The trial court held that the plaintiff
had to prove actual malice to recover. The Utah Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case, adopting a negligence standard
of recovery. Since the plaintiff did not enjoy "pervasive power"
and had not voluntarily become involved in some public controversy, the court found the plaintiff to be a private individual. 0
In justifying the public/private distinction, the court said that
private persons are involuntary news figures and have little ability
to rebut press accounts effectively.'' Additionally, information
about a public person often is more relevant to the decision-making
process. Moreover, a public person assumed certain risks while
a private person had not.17'
693 (1978). See also, Sobel v. Miami Daily News, 282 So. 2d 282 (Fl. App. 1981)
(per curiam).
In Preston & Land, 220 Va. 118, 255 S.E.2d 509 (1979), the Virginia Supreme
Court held that private individuals must show actual malice to recover. The court
defined actual malice, however, in terms of ill will or spite, common law malice.
The validity of this holding is questionable since showing ill will does not equal
fault. New York has adopted a standard approaching gross negligence. Chapadeau
v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S. 61 (1975).
162 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). The case involved a report that the plaintiff
had been treating his horses inhumanely.
0
",
17

Id. at 972.
Id. at 973-74.
Id. at 974.
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The Utah court's rejection of the actual malice standard, as
in other jurisdictions, may have been motivated by the always
present fear of a press run amuck. "Society has not interest in
the dissemination of statements which are false and which could
'
have been prevented through the exercise of reasonable care."
7 society has,
While the value of a falsehood has been debated,
in the past and very much today, distrusted the motives and actions of the press.
B. Actual Malice Standard
Jurisdictions embracing a higher degree of fault, either gross
negligence or actual malice, adopt the philosophy that the first
amendment protects discussion of issues and events relevant to
an informed citizenry. Its protection, therefore, should not turn
on the notoriety or obscurity of the plaintiff.
The Colorado Supreme Court was one of the first jurisdictions to reject the Supreme Court's invitation to adopt a negligence standard. Walker v. Colorado Springs, Inc."'5 involved
published articles about the ownership of certain stolen property. An antique dealer had unknowingly purchased stolen property
taken in a home burglary. When the owner discovered the whereabouts of her property, she asked for its return. The dealer offered to sell it to her for what he thought he could obtain on the
market. The woman refused." 6 The Colorado court adhered to the
Rosenbloom test, saying that the negligence rule resulted in
self-censorship.
Our ruling here results simply from our conclusion that a simple negligence rule would cast such a chilling effect upon the
news media that it would print insufficient facts in order to protect itself against libel actions; and that this insufficiency would
be more harmful to the public interest than the possibility of
lack of adequate compensation to a defamation-injured private
individual."'

Thus, as in Rosenbloom and Gertz, the decision turns on how
173

Id.

..Whether false statements are "valuable" to society has been hotly debated.
Compare"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact,", Gertz, 418
U.S. at 340, with Emerson, supra note 56, at 536.
" 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
17 Id. at 89; 538 P.2d at 451-53.

" Id. at 99; 538 P.2d at 458.
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the competing interests are to be weighed. Does a private person's reputation weigh against the first amendment scale greater
than that of a public person? Does a test based on status further
the first amendment's central purpose-a national commitment
to open discussion and debate? The Supreme Court fragmented
in trying to decide these questions. Left to their own devices, state
courts are repeating the same arguments and making the same
analyses as the Court did in Rosenbloom and Gertz.
C.

West Virginia's Standard

In Havalunch,the state supreme court opted for a negligence
standard in cases involving private figure libel plaintiffs. However,
the court's lack of analysis in making this decision and the lack
of need to reach that question in the particular case render the
choice somewhat suspect. It can be argued that any judicial attempt to balance freedom of the press and defamation is a neverending struggle to perform the impossible. Courts should, perhaps,
give up the fight and decide openly which interest has more individual and societal value. At the federal level, this would be
possible since the Constitution protects freedom of the press, but
not the right to recover for defamation. A different situation exists at the state level, however. For example, the West Virginia
Constitution provides for both freedom of the press and recovery
for defamation. Consequently, these constitutional provisions collide in enforcement.
Despite the court's action in Havalunch,this Note will argue
that West Virginia should adopt an across-the-board actual malice
standard. No distinction between public and private persons need
be made. Additionally, the "public or general interest" and the
"public controversy" tests should be abandoned. They force courts
to make a subjective value judgment on what "news" or information the public needs. Adoption of the actual malice standard is
supported by the state constitution, public policy and both state
constitutional and common law defamation decisions.
1. West Virginia Constitution
The state constitution contains two provisions concerning
freedom of the press and defamation. Article 3, section 7 provides
that "[n]o law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
shall be passed, but the legislature may by suitable penalties
. . . provide for the punishment of libel, and defamation of
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character, and for the recovery, in civil actions, by the aggrieved
party, of suitable damages ....,"178Section 8 of that same article
specifies that a true statement, published with good motives and
justifiable ends, constitutes an absolute bar to a defamation suit."'
Consequently, West Virginia is a state where individuals have
a constitutional right to recover for defamation, subject only to
the strictures of the first amendment and the state's freedom of
the press provision.
2.

Prior Case Law

As discussed previously, the development of the common law
defamation suit in West Virginia paralleled that in other jurisdictions. The two primary differences were the added constitutional
requirement on use of truth as a defense and the extension of
the fair comment qualified privilege to misstatements of fact.1
The latter difference supports adoption of an actual malice standard because it reflects a sensitivity to the inhibiting effects of
financial liability on anyone attempting to engage in open discussion. Such sensitivity was implicit in the state supreme court's
extension of the fair comment common law privilege in Bailey v.
CharlestonDaily Mail Association,1 ' perhaps the only pre-Sullivan
state decision to consider the interplay between defamation and
an active press.
In that case, the defendant newspaper claimed that the allegedly defamatory editorial dealt with "a matter of public interest and
concern .... and, that although untrue statements may appear
therein, that such statements were made in good faith without
malice .. . ."I' Although application of the fair comment privilege
placed West Virginia in the minority view, this was the position
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Sullivan. The
West Virginia court's opinion foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
rationale for applying the first amendment to defamation actions.
Once appointed or elected, the unyielding requirements of public
W. VA. CONST.

art. 3, S 7.

"In prosecutions and civil suits for libel, the truth may be given in evidence,
and if it shall appear to the jury, that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the verdict shall
be for the defendant." W. VA. CONST. art. 3, S 8.
17

110 See

III

supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943).

'

Id. at 303-04; 27 S.E.2d at 843.
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welfare demand that a public official keep in view only one
object-the strict performance of his duties in accordance with
law and the unchanging principles of honest government. The
slightest departure from such standards of conduct can be neither
excused nor condoned. Adherence to a high standard of official
conduct is stimulated by investigation and reasonableand honest
criticism.' &
Since the Bailey court specifically limited its decision to comment on official conduct of public offices, it can be argued that
the case supports distinguishing between public and private persons. The case, however, concerned a state official and his performance of official duties. In its holding, the court developed a rule
of law for that type of fact situation. Unlike cases involving
statutory or constitutional questions, common law decisions tried
to stay with the fact situation rather than expand application of
the holding." Additionally, the court specifically adopted a rule
of law "conducive to a high standard in the activities of the public
press.""' If a forerunner of Sullivan found that the press needed
protection to enhance its ability to perform its societal role, the
maximum constitutional standard of actual malice should be
adopted.
Two recent decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, both decided on constitutional grounds, indirectly support adoption of the Sullivan standard. 86 In State ex rel. Daily
Mail PublishingCo. v. Smith,"7 the court relied on developed first
amendment doctrine to declare unconstitutional a statute prohibiting a newspaper from publishing the names of juveniles charged
with crimes. Two newspapers, and several broadcast media, had
published the name of a youth accused of killing a classmate. The
court found the statute to be a prior restraint on the press. The
state's asserted interest-the ability to assure a youthful offender
a prejudice-free future-did not meet the constitutional test for
prior restraint." This case reflected the present court's sensitivity
to the role of open discussion in society.
Id. at 303; 27 S.E.2d at 842-43 (emphasis added).
,1Aldisert, The Nature of the JudicialProcess:Revisited, 49 U. CIN. L. REv.
1, 11-16 (1980).
"3 126 W. Va. at 305, 27 S.E.2d at 844.
114 See notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
" 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978), affid, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
,3Id.
"3
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189
The second decision, State ex rel. HeraldMail v. Hamilton,
involved an attempt by a criminal defendant to exclude the public
and the press from a pre-trial hearing. The trial judge had ordered
the hearing closed after the defendant claimed that a public proceeding would interfere with his right to a fair trial. After reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions on the closure issue,'9 which
had distinguished pre-trial and trial proceedings, the state supreme
court reversed the closure order. Relying on Article 3, sections
14 ' and 17,192 which relate to public trials, the court held that
the right of access is a personal right of each member of the public.
Therefore, the court said that the West Virginia court provision
is broader than the sixth amendment to the federal constitution."93
Although the state constitution's freedom of the press clause did
not play a part in the decision, the court considered the effect
that exclusion of the press would have on society. "4 Herald Mail,
then, exemplifies the broad interpretation given West Virginia
constitutional provisions. 95 Adoption of the actual malice standard,
based on the state's freedom of the press clause, would be consistent with the court's past treatment of freedom of the press issues.

3. Policy Considerations
The Rosenbloom-Gertz policy battle has been carried on by the
state courts as each jurisdiction defines its defamation action.
Jurisdictions adopting a negligence standard cite the Gertz rationale: lack of access, forfeiture of protection by public persons,
the state interest in protecting reputation, and the judicial balancing inherent in deciding what is of "public or general interest."
267 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1980).
IS

See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 55 (1980); Gannett

v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
,' "Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided,
shall be by a jury of twelve men, public ...." W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14.
192 "The courts of this state shall be open .... Id. at art. 3, S 17.
19 267 S.E.2d at 547.
19 Id.
at 549-50.
,' See, e.g., Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979) (education is a fundamental constitutional right); State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919
(W. Va. 1978) (entitlement to tenure constitutes sufficient property interest for
college teacher to require a procedural due process hearing before denial of tenure);
Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760 (W. Va. 1980) (gender-based classifications are
suspect).
Comparewith San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973) (education); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (tenure); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex).
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Those states adopting a higher standard rely on Rosenbloom's
belief that the first amendment protects issue discussion regardless of a person's status, that no difference exists in the reputational interests of public and private persons, that problems occur in defining public controversy, and that self-censorship results
under a negligence standard. These factors can be arranged and
weighed according to a court's pre-existing preferences. Indeed,
it is difficult not to believe that decisions regarding the standard
of fault are based on a judge's personal conviction of the value
and role of the media in society. Several of the cited considerations will now be examined.
a.

Access to the media

In Gertz, the Supreme Court reasoned that a private individual
lacked the resources to effectively rebut defamatory statement
with additional speech. ' This, therefore, justified imposition of
a higher standard of care on a defendant. This rationale has been
applauded and attacked by commentators, 9 ' depending on their
personal predilections toward the press.
It would, however, be difficult to find a practicing journalist
who believes that influential persons are not able to generate
media attention more easily than a private person quite suddenly
"discovered" by an enterprising reporter. 9 ' For example, suppose
a newspaper publishes an article based on a public report that
an attempted murder occurred during a family argument. If the
family involved is that of a local prominent citizen, then the
newspaper often, for various reasons, would be likely to publish
a family member's rebuttal. If, on the other hand, the police had
charged a high-school dropout familiar to authorities from past
incidents, his or the family's side of the story likely would get
little consideration. This decision, of course, would reflect the news
418 U.S. at 344.
' See, e.g., Eaton, The American Law of DefamationThrough Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REV. 1349,1420-21 (1975);
(Gertz assumes that the media will grant public figures rebuttal time).
The question of the effectiveness of the self-help remedy has been questioned
by the Supreme Court. "Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices
to undo the harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted
in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie." Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 344 n.9.
198This statement is based on the author's personal experiences as a professional journalist.
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judgment of a reporter or an editor regarding what interests the
public. More "news" exists than resources for reporting it. The
"yesterday's news is old news" theory also negates the idea that
access is available to those without special attention-getting
powers.
b.

Forfeiture of protection

The Gertz rationale rests' largely on the proposition that public
persons forfeit some right to legal protection of their reputations
by engaging in public activity." By remaining unknown, private
individuals retain all rights to full protection of the law. Such a
view is difficult to square on an equitable basis. Theoretically,
society's interest in the good name of Johnny Carson or Jack
Smith is the same. Individuals certainly believe their reputations
to be worthy of equal treatment.
The Supreme Court's argument is that a public person voluntarily accepts the risk of being defamed. This assumes, however,
that persons consciously weigh the benefits and costs of public
activity. Persons usually engage in such actions for various
reasons, including civic duty. By protecting private persons more,
the law encourages non-participation on issues of great importance.
This can and will have great consequences for a democratic society dependent on grass roots participation for true representation.
3.

Purpose of the First Amendment

The Rosenbloom plurality, and its adherents, trace their theory
to the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan. That case, they
reasoned, was based on a "national committment to robust and
wide-open debate." Thus, debate need not be "political" in the
sense of government. "Our efforts to live and work together in
a free society not completely dominated by governmental regulation necessarily encompasses far more than politics in a narrow
200
sense."
The first amendment covers a broad range of protected activities. Although consisting of only 45 words, it protects several

' "[The communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that
public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
' 403 U.S. at 41 (plurality opinion).
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fundamental rights. Therefore, courts should focus on what is being discussed, not whom. "If a matter is a subject of public or
general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because
a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved. The
public's primary interest is in the event." ''
In interpreting Sullivan, however, the status of the plaintiff
cannot be dismissed so easily. Sullivan was the police commissioner of a fair-sized southern city. A great deal of the Supreme
Court's opinion devoted itself to explaining that criticism of public
officials constituted criticism of government. Such criticism, the
Court said, lies at the very core of the first amendment. A citizen
cannot be prohibited from discussing an official's performance;
therefore, such laws as Sedition Act of 1798 were unconstitutional." ' Still, the overriding impact of Sullivan remains the protection of open discussion. Certainly this was the rationale used
to extend the actual malice rule to public figures in Butts."3
4.

The negligence standard and self-censorship

The overriding concern of Rosenbloom and of courts adopting
its rationale concerns the effect of a negligence standard on the
media. " Such an uncertain standard, left in the hands of judges
and juries, will result in self-censorship. Whether one publisher
used "reasonable care" in its reporting often will be obscured by
a jury's desire to reward the plaintiff and punish the defendant.
Such a finding will necessarily depend on the facts of each case.
Arguments against the negligence standard appear difficult
to justify for they sound like the media do not want to be judged
by standards of responsibility prevalent in the industry. This is
not the issue, however. Rather, what is the standard's effect? Does
it promote good standards in the profession? Or does it promote
timidity out of fear that a jury will not believe that the publisher
acted reasonably in preparing and publishing an article?

'Id.

at 43.
376 U.S. at 273-76.
388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result).

2"

"Reasonable care is an 'elusive standard' that 'would place on the press

the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness

of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture
or portrait' [citation omitted]." 403 U.S. at 50.
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The media claim that every "anti-media" decision will "chill"
their operations. Thus, they resemble the little boy crying "wolf."
There are, however, identifiable reasons for believing that a negligence standard inhibits the reporting of needed information.
First, the question of negligence usually is a question of fact
for the jury. Consequently, a negligence standard would make it
easier for a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment
and impose the intimidating costs of litigation on a defendant. This
is especially true in West Virginia since the state supreme court
has ruled that summary judgments are to be granted rarely in
negligence actions.s Judges should be able to decide whether the
that the defenplaintiff could show, by clear and convincing proof,
2
dant made the statement with actual malice. 1
The cost of litigation relates directly to use of the negligence
standard and summary judgment motions. The institutional press
in this country, for good or bad, is commercial in nature. Profit
means survival. If a publisher thinks a story will cost him money
in legal fees, the temptation to "kill" the article presents itself.
Of course, this temptation will be handled differently by publishers. The timid and profit-conscious will supress. The powerful
and financially stable will publish. Still, the overall effect of the
negligence standard has been accurately observed by Mr. Justice
Brennan.
[T]he negligence standard gives insufficient breathing space to
First Amendment values ...It is not simply the possibility of
a judgment for damages that results in self-censorship. The very
possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and
protracted process, is threat enough to cause discussion and
debate to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' thereby keeping
protected discussion from public congnizance.1°

21 "Furthermore, our Court has been wary of allowing summary judgment
in negligence cases since it is the jury's peculiar province to determine conflicting facts." Bd. of Educ. v. Van Buren and Firestone, Architects, Inc., 267 S.E.2d
440, 443 (W. Va. 1980). The court, perhaps, would be more lenient in cases involving freedom of the press.
I The use of summary judgment has been recognized as an effective tool
to protect defendants in defamation cases. For example, the Washington Supreme
Court has ruled that libel plaintiffs must introduce evidence of "convincing clarity" which establishes a primafacie case in order to withstand a defendant's motion for summary judgment. Mark v. The Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash.

1981).
403 U.S. at 52-53 (plurality opinion).
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This concern over financial liability also was a factor in the
Court's application of constitutional principles to defamation law.
In Sullivan, the plaintiff had been awarded $500,000 for an article which had not even mentioned him by name. Fear of financial
loss was classified as having a harmful effect on the media.
In the end, though, claims of self-censorship remain thatclaims. As in other first amendment issues, the varying contentions cannot be proved empirically. Courts accept or reject these
arguments depending on the desired result. A more certain and
constitutionally-based rationale is needed.

VI.

AN ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD FOR EVERYONE

The debate over negligence or actual malice usually is couched
in terms of first amendment theory. The state constitution's free
press clause,0 8 and the debate over its adoption give us little
guidance on its intended effect. But it is safe to assume that Article 3, section 7, was modeled after the first amendment. Therefore,
first amendment policy arguments should apply equally to state
freedom of the press provisions. Adoption of the actual malice
standard for all defamation actions will provide certainty in the
law and eliminate subjective judicial decisions over what is a public
controversy or of the public interest. Additionally, it will still allow
for defamation recovery as provided for in the state constitution.
A.

Certainty

As first amendment theory has developed, the Supreme Court
has tried to provide "definitional balancing" by providing broad
rules of general application."' Such rules provide notice of what
activity the first amendment protects and what lies outside its
full scope. The actual malice rule typifies this process. In Sullivan,
the Court weighed the competing interests and then laid down
a rule which accommodated these interests, at least in theory.
This desire for certainty prompted the fifth vote in Gertz. Mr.
Justice Blackmun, who had joined the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, switched positions in Gertz. He did so not out of a belief
that one position was superior to the other, but because he wanted
w. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 7.
"Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each
particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application." 418 U.S. at 343-44.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

39

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

"certainty" in defamation law.21 That has not been accomplished,
although it may be argued that the Court's recent decisions in
Hutchinson and Woiston will help achieve this result. 11 Instead,
courts have struggled with the public figure determination. Additionally, state courts have split over whether a negligence or
actual malice standard should be adopted for private individuals.
Application of the actual malice standard to all plaintiffs will provide certainty to all litigants. All will know the rules of the game
and will not have to depend on a set of easily manipulated criteria
to determine the fault standard applicable to each case.
B.

Elimination of the "Public" Determination

Both Rosenbloom and Gertz require courts to make a subjective determination regarding the "public nature" of an issue.
Under Rosenbloom, a judge had to decide whether the alleged
defamatory publication dealt with a matter of "public or general
interest." The Gertz majority rejected this judicial role. "[ilt would
occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges
to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues
of 'general or public interest' and which do not ... We doubt

the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges. 12
Having said that, the Court then went on to hold that "public
figure" status rests, in part, on a person's voluntary participation
in a public controversy. What is or is not a public controversy
requires just as much subjective determination as that undertaken
in Rosenbloom.
Still, state courts have labored since Gertz to adopt one of
the two competing views. Courts have acknowledged the conceptual difficulties in making either "public" determination, but have
not chosen to fashion their own rules.2 13 A more simple, more
20 The Court was sadly fractionated in Rosenbloom.

A result of that kind inevitably leads to uncertainty. I feel that it is
of profound importance for the Court to come to rest in the defamation
area and to have a clearly defined majority position that eliminates the
unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity. If my vote were not
needed to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior view.
Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
A recent study of defamation cases has concluded that Hutchinson and
Wolston have not affected appellate decisions to date. Franklin, Suing Mediafor
Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Am.BAR. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 797.
212Id. at 346.
2,3See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583,
590 (1st Cir. 1980).
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manageable, and more certain rule would be application of the
actual malice standard to all defamation actions.
Determination of what is in the public interest should be left
to the editorial processes of a reporter or editor. The media is
a commercial institution which depends on public acceptance for
survival. If the public is not interested in the product, that publication will not exist for very long. Of course, this view assumes
that it is better for the media to determine, along with the public,
what should be publicized than judges. The Supreme Court, in
recent cases, has demonstrated its belief that judges should make
the subjective decision of what the public should know. Thus, Mary
Alice Firestone's divorce is not worthy of expanded protection,
nor are the right-wing charges of the John Birch Society." 4 The
Court has set itself up as arbiter of what the public needs to know,
a position traditionally left to the media. "The very essence of
a system of free expression is that the participants are the ones
who judge standing, prestige, the weight to be accorded a particular speaker, and all similar matters. These issues are to be
fought out in the public forum, not decided by government authorities.""'
Application of the actual malice requirement to defamation
in its entirety must be reconciled with a West Virginia citizen's
constitutional right to sue for defamation. Rejection of the Gertz
rationale would have represented a policy judgment on which interest is to be accorded greater weight. Examination of the underlying basis for freedom of expression and the tort of defamation
provides support for favoring freedom of expression and adoption of an actual malice standard.
The first amendment and the state's freedom of the press constitutional provisions establish and protect our system for freedom
of expression. Various purposes and rules have been advanced
as justification for free expression. It has been said that "freedom
of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
'
self-fulfillment,"216
and "an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth. 2 17 An oft-cited purpose is the need
"to provide for participation in decision making by all members

214 418

U.S. at 323.

215Emerson, supra note 56, at 543.
211
217

Id. at 6.
Id.
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'
of society."218
A fourth principle is that freedom of expression
achieves "a more adaptable and hence a more stable community,
of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage
'
and necessary consensus."219
A historic, but often unarticulated
role, is that actions taken by the media under the first amendment act to check abuses of power by government."

Arrayed against these purposes are those concerning recovery
for defamation. Injury to reputation encompasses two aspects:
economic injury and community standing. Defamation actions also
seek to compensate injury to a person's feelings. Another role,
often unmentioned by courts or commentators, is the control over
the media represented by a defamation suit. Judges do not wish
to provide the press with a supposed "license to libel"; therefore,
financial recovery will keep the media within limits. This theory
is one justification for the majority rule not extending the fair
comment common law privilege to misstatements of fact.221
It seems clear that the fundamental factors inherent in
freedom of expression require that defamation restrictions be
removed to the greatest extent possible from the media. Free
speech and press rights include
the right to form and hold beliefs and opinions, and information
through any medium-in speech, writing, music, art, or in other
ways. To some extent, it involves the right to remain silent.
From the observer's side it includes the right to hear the views
of others and to listen to their version of the facts.
Exercise of these rights should occupy a prominent, even
perhaps dominant position in a democratic society. Certainly, they
are instrinscially superior to the recovery of monetary damages.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Havalunch decision is the latest attempt by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to grapple with the intricate
relationship between constitutional and common law defamation
principles. Unfortunately, the court seems unable to recognize the
Id. at 7.
Id.
I Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR Fo N.

21"
219

DATION REs. J. 521.
21

126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943) (adopting minority rule).
Emerson, supra note 56, at 3.
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differences between these two lines of law. In Havalunch,the court
reached issues unnecessary to decide the case in order to "settle" state law. Instead, the court, with a minimum of analysis,
made mistakes. It adopted negligence as the standard of fault a
private figure defamation plaintiff must show in West Virginia
in order to recover damages. This decision was made without considering past state law in the constitutional and common law areas
of defamation, without considering the public policy implications
of an actual malice rather than a negligence standard, and without
considering the role of a free press in today's society. These considerations pointed toward adoption of an actual malice standard
for all libel plaintiffs. Mr. Justice Neely may have wanted to
"adumbrate" the court's direction in defamation law; alas, he and
the court decided a significant question of law with little analysis.
A little thought might have resulted in a better result or at least
a more defensible one.
W. Martin Harrell
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